UNITED
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S/1995/184
7 March 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of Kuwait's position with respect to the developments that have taken place in connection with Iraq's remaining obligations under the Security Council resolutions relating to its aggression against the State of Kuwait since the Council's most recent review of the sanctions regime on 12 January 1995.

1. Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and hostages

This is an issue to which Kuwait accords special priority in view of its purely humanitarian character and because it affects the sentiments of all Kuwaitis and of the peoples of those countries that have prisoners or hostages in Iraq. Iraq had declared that it would cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in this matter and has recently participated in the meetings on prisoners and hostages held by the tripartite committee and its technical subcommittee. However, none of these meetings, the most recent of which was that of the technical subcommittee on 23 and 24 February 1995, has had any satisfactory outcome. During the meetings, Iraq instead demonstrated that it is lacking in seriousness in this domain. We can say with full assurance that Iraq's avowed cooperation with ICRC and its participation in the meetings of the tripartite committee and its technical subcommittee have thus far failed to produce any decisive result with respect to this extremely important humanitarian issue. That failure can be ascribed to the following reasons:

1. After an embargo that has lasted nearly three years, Iraq has only participated in such meetings in order to create the impression of pro-forma cooperation, particularly since the Security Council has continued to accord importance to this humanitarian issue and has insisted that Iraq cooperate in discharging this humanitarian obligation in a manner satisfactory to the Council.

2. The replies thus far provided by Iraq on the dossiers of prisoners and hostages have the real objective only of evading responsibility towards these innocent people, and they do not represent a genuine effort to bring their fate

to light and to carry out a serious search for those believed to be missing in Iraq in accordance with proper and customary procedures.

3. The Iraqi strategy in participating in a pro-forma manner in the meetings of the technical subcommittee is based on wasting time, engaging in disputations on nomenclature and the legal status of the prisoners and claiming that documents are lacking and that information is inadequate. Iraq does this with a view to getting through what it regards as the upcoming critical stage with regard to the sanctions issue, which it thinks apt to see the adoption of a resolution mitigating the sanctions without being affected or postponed by the issue of the prisoners and hostages.

Accordingly, Kuwait urges the States members of the Security Council to maintain their resolute positions of principle and to continue their earnest endeavours to compel Iraq to release all Kuwaiti and third-country prisoners and hostages immediately. Members of the Council should note the manner in which the Iraqi Government is dealing with this issue and through which it is seeking to deceive them and avoid addressing its legal responsibilities under this clear example of its remaining obligations.

2. Return of property seized during the Iraqi aggression

Iraq's limited cooperation in the matter of the return of the property seized during its invasion and occupation of Kuwait must not divert attention from the fact that there are many items, of which lists have been submitted by Kuwait, that have yet to be returned. (See our letters of 4 October 1994 (S/1994/1126) and 14 January 1995 (S/1995/14), both addressed to the Secretary-General.) Most significantly, the property in question includes some 200 armoured vehicles that remain in Iraq's possession and which the Iraqi regime used in its recent military deployments near the boundaries with Kuwait. Further, Iraq maintains its refusal to return the HAWK missile system, which remains in its possession. Kuwait also attaches the utmost importance to the return by Iraq of all the official documents looted by Iraqi forces from the Office of the Amir, the Office of the Crown Prince, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No price can compensate for such documents, and they cannot be regarded as property such as that referred to the United Nations Compensation Commission. The Iraqi authorities continue to insist, moreover, that they are not responsible for the return of property stolen from the private sector. The value of that property exceeds hundreds of millions of dollars, and it was dispatched to Iraq on the basis of inventories drawn up by Iraqi ministries and signed and stamped by designated government agencies that came to Kuwait to supervise the theft and removal operations. We have in our possession originals and copies of such documents left behind by the Iraqi regime on its ejection.

Iraq has, moreover, yet to discharge its obligations with regard to the United Nations Compensation Fund, the renunciation of terrorism and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991).

Kuwait attaches particular importance to the implementation by Iraq of the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and would like to stress the following points:

1. It is important and essential for Iraq to take all necessary steps for the effective implementation of all the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to demonstrate its peaceful intentions towards the State of Kuwait and neighbouring States in a manner conducive to strengthening the foundations of security and stability in this vital region of the world.

2. The degree to which Iraq's obligations have thus far been discharged would not have been achieved had it not been for the firm will and the unity of outlook and purpose displayed by the members of the Security Council. We hope that this situation will continue until such time as Iraq's remaining obligations are also discharged.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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7 March 1995
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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In addition to my letter of 3 March 1995 and on instructions from my Government, I should like to transmit to you herewith the reaction of the Government of Burundi to the contents of the report concerning the Security Council mission to Bujumbura on 10 and 11 February 1995 (S/1995/163).

1. The Government wishes first of all to thank the Security Council, which, since the outbreak of the crisis of October 1993, has been taking critical steps and diplomatic good offices initiatives in order that Burundi may regain its peace, security and stability.

2. The Security Council's recent mission to Bujumbura on 10 and 11 February 1995 took place at a moment of institutional crisis. Since then, the situation has developed in a positive direction.

3. The political situation is not "potentially explosive", as the report states. The tension observed during the mission's stay in Burundi was linked to the opposition's demand for the ousting of Mr. Anatole Kanyenkiko, the Prime Minister at the time. Today, a new Prime Minister and a new Government have just been appointed by consensus, as provided for in the Convention of government.

4. There are, nevertheless, some problems of insecurity in certain parts of the country. Such is the case of the armed bands that are attacking population groups on hills or in displaced person camps, or which attack military positions. There are also acts of criminality in both rural and urban areas, since the civilian population has illegally acquired firearms. It should be pointed out that any malevolent action is easily viewed from the political-ethnic angle and usually involves reprisals.

The disarmament of the armed population groups also provoked confrontations between the forces of law and order and the groups in possession of firearms. However, the international community should not promote a war scare in Burundi.

5. It is erroneous to state that the security forces "constitute an independent power centre" and that "their support of the coalition Government cannot be taken for granted" (para. 17).

The security forces obey the policy laid down by the Government. Their task is to ensure the security of citizens and of the established institutions. If, after the crisis, they had been derelict in their duty, Burundi would have sunk into unspeakable chaos. Nevertheless, policemen, gendarmes or military men are men like any others; some may commit excesses. In proven cases, the culprits were subject to the military regulations. For example, certain individuals presumed responsible for the attempted coup d'état of October 1993 have been arrested and await trial.

6. The Government of Burundi has never imposed restrictions on the movement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) military observer group. On the contrary, collaboration between the mission and the political authorities, on the one hand, and with the forces of law and order, on the other hand, is regularly commended by the Burundi authorities and the Secretary-General of OAU. The Government of Burundi is also astonished to read in the report that the OAU military observers suffered restrictions on their movement imposed by the Burundian security forces.

7. With regard to augmentation of the number of these observers, the appropriateness of such a step should be determined by the Government of Burundi itself, which has hitherto greatly appreciated the role of this mission in the field. One such determination has been made, and in accordance with the provisions of the Convention of government (it is the National Security Council that debates such a question, under article 16 of the Convention), the Government will then be able to officially put its request to the Secretary-General of OAU.

8. With regard to the International Commission of Judicial Inquiry, the President of the Republic has already addressed a request on the subject to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

9. The recommendation as worded in paragraph 22 of the report speaks of augmenting the United Nations presence in Burundi. If it is a question of strengthening the office of the special representative of the Secretary-General, that presents no problem to the Government of Burundi. However, if it is a question of assisting this Government in the three missions listed in the same paragraph, Burundi makes the following reservations:

(a) Building an impartial judicial system: in Burundi we need rather to support the existing judicial system, which lacks modern working methods for carrying out its mission successfully. The Government has already addressed a request in that regard to certain outside partners, and the response is positive. The United Nations should therefore fall in with the other partners in this matter;

(b) Civilian police training: here the President of the Republic has ordered the creation of a specialized anti-terrorism squad to combat terrorism in the urban centres and a specialized disarmament squad. The Government is in

the process of implementing this measure and external partners have agreed to provide these two specialized units with adequate means to carry out their work. The establishment of a civilian police force is therefore unnecessary. It would create greater confusion since Burundi is already experiencing difficulties in coordinating the activities of the various existing police forces, namely: the Public Security Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Frontier Police (which also deals with foreigners), the National Intelligence Department and the Gendarmerie;

(c) Establishment of an effective administrative presence in the provinces: here, too, the Government has already begun to assign to the territorial administration officials who provide reassurance and who are appointed by agreement between the citizens of each administrative entity, as provided for in the Convention of government. The process is continuing.

The Government of Burundi requests the international community to assist in providing this administration with the logistical means to carry out its work in order to guide the population more effectively in the direction of peace and reconciliation. A request to this effect has been prepared by the Minister of the Interior and is available.

10. Lastly, the report refers to the possibility of imposing "selective sanctions ... against individuals believed to belong to extremist groups in Burundi" (para. 27). We believe that it is difficult for the international community to have a correct understanding of the notion of extremist in the case of Burundi, a country whose social fabric has been literally torn apart since the crisis of October 1993. Moreover, measures of this kind have virtually no real, appreciable or beneficial effect on the population of Burundi. Furthermore, the hard core of extremists is relatively small compared to the multitude who want, and are working for, peace.

On the other hand it would be wise to attack the declared warmongers, who have mobilized a parallel army and who, from both outside and inside the country, are provoking attacks and deadly confrontations. We are thinking in particular of the so-called "Forces for the Defence of Democracy", extremist forces referred to in paragraph 16 of the report. It is these forces which are preventing reconciliation among the people of Burundi and depriving them of the peace and security of which they are so much in need. These warmongers are well known and they travel freely in neighbouring countries and throughout the world. They are even financed by certain Western circles and lobbies.

11. The international community should also support the efforts being made by the Government in pursuing its policy of a return to peace and security. To that end, the international community should, while condemning the warmongers, avoid making alarmist statements and resolutely strive to provide positive and reassuring encouragement.

12. The Government of Burundi greatly appreciates the role played by the United Nations during the crisis and hopes that it will continue to work to ensure that Burundi does not sink into the abyss. The Government of Burundi offers its full cooperation to the United Nations in order to prevent further conflicts.

I should be grateful if you would have the contents of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Melchiade BUKURU
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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S/1995/186
8 March 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with regret the death of Judge Roberto Ago on 24 February 1995,

Noting further that a vacancy in the International Court of Justice for the remainder of the term of office of the deceased Judge has thus occurred and must be filled in accordance with the terms of the Statute of the Court,

Noting that, in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute, the date of the election to fill the vacancy shall be fixed by the Security Council,

Decides that the election to fill the vacancy shall take place on 21 June 1995 at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

95-06779 (E) 090395 100395

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7 March 1995

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LETTER DATED 7 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward herewith the statement of a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 28 February 1995.

I would be grateful if you could kindly arrange to have this statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

95-06442 (E) 070395 080395

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Annex

Statement of a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 28 February 1995

The United States and some of its followers are these days raising a row, distorting the facts over the issue of the withdrawal of the Polish delegation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission by arguing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea violated the Armistice Agreement and international law.

This is motivated by the sinister purpose of shifting the responsibility for the total paralysis of the armistice machinery upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and barring the process of the establishment of a new peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

That the issue of the withdrawal of the Polish delegation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has cropped up is a natural result of the systematic acts of the United States to destroy the Korean Armistice Agreement and armistice machinery.

It is widely known to the world that the United States side, a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, has reduced the provisions of the Agreement and its enforcement devices to nominal things in favour of its occupation of South Korea and its arms build-up.

The United States side forced the inspection teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which had been formed according to paragraphs 40 and 43 of article 2 of the Armistice Agreement, to withdraw from its side's area in June 1956 and then unilaterally abrogated subparagraphs 13C and 13D of the Armistice Agreement on stopping the introduction of reinforcing military personnel and combat materials into Korea, the main duty of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in June 1957.

As a result, paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Armistice Agreement, defining it as the mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to supervise and investigate the introduction of reinforcing military personnel and combat materials, lost their legal effect.

Since then the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has existed only in name.

Worse still, the United States side paralysed even the function of the Military Armistice Commission, the main truce supervisory machinery by appointing a "General" of the South Korean puppet army, which was not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement and had no qualification at all, as its Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission in March 1991.

All these subversive acts of the United States side were committed unilaterally, without agreement with us.

Owing to this, paragraph 61 of article 5 of the Armistice Agreement, stipulating that the Armistice Agreement could be amended and supplemented only under agreement between the commanders of both sides, lost its legal validity.

The Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, its auxiliary organ, were destroyed and paralysed by the United States side, a signatory to the Agreement, and no more hope could hinge on them.

It is a matter pertaining to the sovereignty of a sovereign State and it conforms to international legal relations for us to take commensurate steps under this condition.

So the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed negotiations for establishing a solid peace mechanism in April last year and took the steps of withdrawing its delegation from the Military Armistice Commission on its own initiative to accelerate this process.

The side of the Chinese People's Volunteers, too, withdrew its delegation in keeping with the situation obtaining.

With the Korean-Chinese side completely withdrawn from the Military Armistice Commission, the Polish delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission automatically lost even the machinery to rely on.

We expected that the Polish side would act in conformity with the prevailing situation. But our expectation was not answered.

So the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Government could not but suspend the legal validity of the designation and invitation of Poland as a member nation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in July 1953 when the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed.

The withdrawal of the Polish delegation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has been raised also because of the unproductive position of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission today.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has nothing to do now. Its members only eat and sleep. If there is anything it does, it plays the role of camouflage for justifying the unreasonable stand of the United States for maintaining the already destroyed cold-war system.

The United States, regardless of the existence of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, is freely reinforcing its armed forces and staging adventurous military exercises in South Korea.

So we do not feel the need to maintain the Polish delegation, continuously bearing the burden of unproductive expenditure.

The withdrawal of the Polish delegation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is indispensable also for the establishment of a solid peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

But the United States and some of its followers, ignoring our proposal to have negotiations for the establishment of a new peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, are trying hard to keep the armistice system as it is.

The United States is using the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as an important expedient here.

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the Polish delegation is not merely a matter related to the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Poland but a matter of a stand showing whether one truly wants durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula or confrontation and growing tension as in the cold-war era.

We aim at terminating the present state of truce, a legacy of the cold-war era, and establishing a peace mechanism meeting the demands of reality.

Therefore, it would be welcomed if the Polish Government withdrew its delegation from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, expressing understanding of our recommendation, and it would be conducive to the promotion of the peace process on the Korean peninsula.

The United States and the forces following it must act in favour of the preservation of peace, clearly seeing the trend of the world towards détente after the termination of the East-West confrontation and the situation created on the Korean peninsula.

If our partner fails to do so and creates complexity, we will be left with no other choice but to take a legitimate step to cope with this.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Agenda item 39
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 6 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a note dated 24 February 1995 from the Working Group consisting of members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference contributing troops to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, concerning the future of UNPROFOR and additional measures to enhance its effectiveness.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 39, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmed SNOUSSI
Permanent Representative
Chairman of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference Contact Group

95-06428 (E) 070395 070395 080395

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Annex

[Original: English]

Note dated 24 February 1995 from the Working Group consisting of members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference contributing troops to the United Nations Protection Force and members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina

We, the undersigned, who are members of the Working Group that consists of the OIC members contributing troops to UNPROFOR and the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, have contributed the following ideas as a diplomatic perspective on the future of UNPROFOR and as additional measures to enhance its effectiveness in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We welcome the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of troop-contributing States, UNPROFOR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held in The Hague on 19 and 20 December 1994 and thank the Government of the Netherlands for its able hosting of this important meeting,

Being aware that the Hague meetings addressed general military considerations for the operation of UNPROFOR and believing that a continuing evaluation is desirable to provoke also a more forward-looking analysis not necessarily constrained by the lowest common denominator,

We, the undersigned,

1. Commend the courageous efforts of the brave men and women serving within UNPROFOR and other United Nations-mandated organizations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

2. Believe that UNPROFOR still can contribute to improving the humanitarian situation, to deterring human rights abuses and attacks upon civilians, and to enhancing the environment for a durable peace settlement based on the acceptance of the five-nation contact group peace plan;

3. Also believe that the current mandate leaves substantial room for a more assertive and effective mission by UNPROFOR and relevant regional organizations, especially bearing in mind Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, although there could be potential enhancement of the existing Security Council mandate of UNPROFOR;

4. Express concern that, although UNPROFOR has accomplished much in its mission, certain events have contributed to a rapid erosion in UNPROFOR's capacity to execute its mandates effectively;

5. Further believe that, in order to reverse this erosion and best avoid a termination of this mission, a greater political resolve must be captured, simultaneously, both in the search for a political settlement and in the

capacity of UNPROFOR and relevant regional organizations to execute their current mandate;

6. Support resolute protection of the "safe areas" in accordance with Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) and remain open to options to strengthen their implementation and the defence of the safe areas;

7. Reiterate the urgent necessity of defining the boundaries of the safe areas in a manner consistent with Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), while taking into account the recommendations of UNPROFOR;

8. Favour the establishment of a secure land corridor from Split to Sarajevo;

9. Also favour urgent opening of Tuzla airport for more efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance;

10. Following the exclusion zone practice in Sarajevo, emphasize the need to have all Serbian anti-aircraft systems removed or neutralized as these can only be directed at UNPROFOR and NATO and hold the view that, otherwise, UNPROFOR and NATO will lose control of the skies, face increasing dangers to their operations, and suffer significant erosion to their military and political influence over the situation. (The current mandate would allow UNPROFOR/NATO to issue an ultimatum for the anti-aircraft systems to be removed, or for the necessary measures to neutralize their weapons.);

11. Welcome the recent pledges of troops and equipment to UNPROFOR to enhance its capacity to better defend itself and execute its mandates;

12. Encourage the Member States to remain prepared to provide additional troops and equipment to UNPROFOR if the necessity arises;

13. In the event that cease-fire does not hold, believe that UNPROFOR and NATO would be better served by relying upon "judicious" use of force rather than the strict reliance upon "proportionality". This would be more effective in deterrence and in complementing UNPROFOR's and NATO's execution of their mandate;

14. Endorse the "dual-key" concept with the UNPROFOR "key" to be placed at the discretion of the local commander who is in the best position to evaluate the needs and urgency of the situation;

15. Fully support the five-nation contact group peace plan as delivered to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Bosnian Serbs on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, commend the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croats for having accepted the plan, and demand that the Bosnian Serbs do likewise without further delay.

The latter considerations are some ideas that should be evaluated as part of a regular analysis of how to improve the efficiency and security of United Nations-mandated operations in executing their missions. In this context, we commend the initiative of the Hague meeting and encourage such efforts on a more regular basis as needed.

We, the undersigned, strongly emphasize the above-mentioned considerations for further evaluation as part of a progressive and forward-looking means to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness and security.

We request that the content of this letter be taken into consideration as an additional point of reference, with broad support, like the report of the Hague meeting under reference.

We would be grateful if you could have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 39 and of the Security Council.

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Ahmed SNOUSSI
Permanent Representative of Morocco
to the United Nations
Chairman of the OIC Contact Group
on Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Reaz RAHMAN
Permanent Representative of Bangladesh
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Nabil A. ELARABY
Permanent Representative of Egypt
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Nugroho WISNUMURTI
Permanent Representative of Indonesia
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Kamal KHARRAZI
Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Adnan S. ABU ODEH
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. RAZALI Ismail
Permanent Representative of Malaysia
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Gaafar M. ALLAGANY
Acting Permanent Representative of
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Keba Birane CISSE
Permanent Representative of Senegal
to the United Nations

(Signed) H.E. Mr. Inal BATU
Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations

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S/1995/189
8 March 1995

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LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 1 December 1994, five Iraqi trucks and loaders were observed conducting engineering activities near the geographic coordinates of TP 290-620 on the map of Khorramshahr in no man's land, opposite Minu Island, east of Iraq's Al-Qateh.

2. On 1 December 1994, 25 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 61 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

3. On 2 December 1994, at 1700 hours, a patrol vessel with Iraq's flag and equipped with two anti-aircraft machine-guns was observed moving from Basra towards the mouth of Arvand Rud.

4. On 2 December 1994, Iraqi forces deployed a 20-mm anti-aircraft machine-gun near the geographic coordinates of ND 390-120 on the map of Khosravi, west of border pillar 56/1.

5. On 3 December 1994, at 1950 hours, Iraqi forces deployed a Grinov machine-gun near the geographic coordinates of ND 457-978 on the map of Khosravi, south of border pillar 51.

6. On 3 December 1994, 33 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 47 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

7. On 3 December 1994, nine Iraqi forces were observed patrolling near the geographic coordinates of ND 435-983 on the map of Khosravi and another four forces aboard a patrol vehicle were observed entering Manzarieh sentry post and inspecting it.

8. On 6 December 1994, 29 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 52 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

9. On 4 December 1994, at 1400 hours, Iraqi forces were observed constructing a bunker at the geographic coordinates of TP 142-786 on the map of Nim-Istgah Navad in no man's land, west of border pillar 5.

10. On 4 December 1994, Iraqi forces installed a walkie-talkie antenna on a bunker and constructed a minor road for logistic purposes at the geographic coordinates NC 710-210 on the map of Halaleh in no man's land, west of border pillar 38.

11. On 4 December 1994, Iraqi forces installed a walkie-talkie antenna on a bunker constructed near the geographic coordinates of ND 390-120 on the map of Khosravi, opposite Darband-Jough, west of border pillar 56/1. They also constructed a minor road for logistic purposes at the same place.

12. On 5 December 1994, 30 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 89 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

13. On 6 December 1994, at 1555 hours, an Iraqi soldier was observed trafficking from Hemad Shahab sentry post to the geographic coordinates of QA 070-930 on the map of Meimeh River in no man's land, south of border pillar 22/29.

14. On 6 December 1994, at 1600 hours, 23 Iraqi soldiers were observed proceeding from near the geographic coordinates of NC 672-241 on the map of Kani-Sheikh in no man's land, between west and north of border pillars 39/1 and 39/2, towards Lajmeh sentry post in no man's land at the geographic coordinates of NC 633-333 on the map of Kani-Sheikh.

15. On 6 December 1994, at 1945 hours, three Iraqi vehicles - a Benz, a Toyota and an IFA - carrying about 20 to 30 passengers were observed disembarking them at the geographic coordinates of ND 422-520 on the map of Khosravi, north of manzarieh and border pillar 53/2 in no man's land.

16. On 6 December 1994, 29 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 51 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

17. On 7 December 1994, at 0930 hours, four Iraqi forces stationed at Doraji sentry post were observed repairing a bunker at the geographic coordinates of PB 106-724 on the map of Mehran, north of Kanjanchem border river, south of Zalou-Ab mountain, in no man's land, south of border pillar 53.

18. On 7 December 1994, at 1000 hours, six Iraqi forces were observed in no man's land at the geographic coordinates of QA 285-824 on the map of Nahr-Anbar, west of border pillar 22/31.

19. On 7 December 1994, 28 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 67 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

20. On 7 December 1994, a ship and two tug-boats with Iraqi flags were observed proceeding from Basra towards the sea.

21. On 8 December 1994, at 0820 hours, about 100 Iraqi forces were observed being trained near the geographic coordinates of NC 415-510 on the map of Naftshahr, south of border pillar 44/13.

22. On 8 December 1994, at 0955 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying over Faw.

23. On 8 December 1994, at 1225 hours, five Iraqi forces entered no man's land at the geographic coordinates of QA 285-824 on the map of Nahr-Anbar, west of border pillar 22/31 and left the area at 1235 hours.

24. On 8 December 1994, at 1300 hours, an Iraqi Toyota vehicle was observed disembarking its armed forces at the geographic coordinates of QA 285-824 on the map of Nahr-Anbar, west of border pillar 22/31 in no man's land. It left the area afterwards.

25. On 8 December 1994, 24 Iraqi motorboats with a total of 52 personnel were observed patrolling Arvand Rud.

26. On 9 December 1994, at 1440 hours, proceeding from the geographic coordinates of PB 003-661 on the map of Mehran, five Iraqi forces equipped with light weapons approached Gavi River in no man's land, east of Kalal-Bardeh and began firing towards the Islamic Republic of Iran's Bahram sentry post situated at the geographic coordinates of PB 007-651. They fled the area when confronted with the reaction of the Iranian border police.

27. On 9 December 1994, 20 Iraqi forces aboard four vehicles entered no man's land near the geographic coordinates of PV 550-490 on the map of western Jofair and installed a new flag, then left the area.

28. On 9 December 1994, an Iraqi IFA vehicle carrying 25 passengers was observed trafficking from near the geographic coordinates of ND 700-250 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land, north of border pillar 58, towards the ND 510-270 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land, east of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Hedayat sentry post and Iraq's Majid-Salar village.

29. On 11 December 1994, at 1015 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying near the geographic coordinates of TP 600-160 on the map of Nahr Alishir, northwest of Ra'as al Bisheh.

30. On 11 December 1994, at 1030 hours, an Iraqi helicopter was observed flying near the geographic coordinates of NC 356-613 and NC 316-617 on the map of southern Naftshahr, north-west of border pillar 46.

31. On 11 December 1994, at 1100 hours, Iraqi forces began firing with light weapons towards the geographic coordinates of NC 5990-3458 on the map of Kani-Sheikh in no man's land, north of border pillar 40/2 and the Islamic Republic of Iran's Kani-Sheikh sentry post.

32. On 11 December 1994, at 2130 hours, Iraqi forces fired five illuminating bullets at the geographic coordinates of QA 285-824 on the map of Nahr Anbar, opposite the Islamic Republic of Iran's Cham-Sari sentry post.

33. On 12 December 1994, at 0720 and 0920 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were observed flying over the geographic coordinates of TP 950-130 on the map of Nahr Alishir and the geographic coordinates of TP 554-191 on the map of Faw.

34. On 12 December 1994, 15 Iraqi white patrol vehicles were observed trafficking near the geographic coordinates of TP-270-690 on the map of Khorramshahr, east of Kout-Zin in no man's land, opposite the confluence of Karoon and Arvand Rud.

35. On 14 December 1994, an Iraqi vessel, which was probably carrying ammunition, was observed near the geographic coordinates of TP 270-690 on the map of Khorramshahr, east of Kout-Zin, opposite the confluence of Karoon and Arvand Rud. The ship was escorted by three Iraqi motorboats.

36. On 15 December 1994, at 1400 hours, Iraqi forces fired an RPG7 rocket from the geographic coordinates of NC 548-416 on the map of Sumar, approximately 500 metres west of border pillar 43 in no man's land, towards Iranian forces. The rocket hit the ground near border pillar 43 at the geographic coordinates of 554-415 on the map of Sumar.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Permanent Representative